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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
gave every benefit to the selling shareholder. Particularly, the
court was unwilling to preclude the defendant from selling his
controlling interest as a block when a less restrictive interpreta-
tion was available.' 9
Thus, while the instant case only assumes the validity of
restrictions on the alienability of stock,20 it increases the likeli-
hood that such restrictions will be accepted in Louisiana. More-
over, the case clearly aligns Louisiana with the majority position
that such restrictions will be strictly construed.
Marshall B. Brinkley
INCOME TAX - TAXABLE INCOME- CONTRIBUTIONS OF SERVICE
AND PROPERTY TO CORPORATION
Appellee, a geologist, agreed with others in a partnership to
look for and buy potentially productive oil and gas properties in
return for a monthly drawing salary and expenses and a part-
nership interest in the properties after the others recovered
their costs. The arrangement proved successful, and when it
became evident that costs would be recovered, the original agree-
ment was terminated and all the oil and gas properties that had
been acquired were transferred to a newly-formed corporation.
Appellee received 13% of the stock but included no part of the
value of the stock in his income tax return for that year.' The
Commissioner ruled that the fair market value of the stock
should have been included in gross income and assessed a defi-
19. 166 So.2d at 360: "To uphold plaintiff's position would be to put Newland
in a position where he would be unable to sell a controlling interest in the corpo-
ration."
20. The court in the instant case, 166 So.2d at 360, states that "restrictions
are valid under Louisiana law," citing State em rel. Scott v. Caddo Rock Drill
Bit Co., 141 La. 353, 75 So. 78 (1917). The Scott case, however, expressly avoided
ruling upon the validity of the provision in question. Id. at 359, 75 So. at 80.
1. The facts in the court of appeal opinion are stated very briefly, but ac-
cording to the district court opinion it appears that from February 9, 1951,
through March 31, 1955, the partnership advanced capital in the sum of $1,245,106
and recovered from oil and gas production on the properties the sum of $1,008,613.
The partnership expected the properties to be paid out by November 30, 1955,
and accordingly the corporation was formed to which were transferred all the
properties acquired through the efforts of appellee under the agreement, with
each party receiving "shares of stock in the corporation proportionate to his
respective interest in the properties." Frazell v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 457,
460 (W.D. La. 1963). The 13% stock interest of appellee in the newly-formed
corporation was determined to have a fair market value of $91,000.
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ciency which appellee, paying under protest, sought to recover
in the district court on the ground that the 13% stock interest
was received as the result of a tax free exchange to a corpora-
tion.2 The district court upheld appellee. On appeal by the Com-
missioner, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Held,
fair market value of corporation stock received as a result of
rendering services to an existing partnership was ordinary in-
come as compensation for services rendered except to the extent
of contribution of a valuable oil map. United States v. Frazell,
335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 339 F.2d 885.
The acquisition and development of oil and gas properties
can be an expensive undertaking3 and it is not uncommon to find
the owner of an oil and gas lease or other mineral interest with-
out sufficient funds to develop it. In such circumstances he may
transfer all or part of his interest to another operator for de-
velopment under what is known as a carried interest arrange-
ment. Under this arrangement the transferee will pay all costs
and receive all income until his costs are recouped, after which
time the parties will share income and expenses in an agreed
proportion. 4 One kind of carried interest transaction is known
as the Manahan type.5 Generally, in the Manahan type carried
interest, A, the transferor, assigns all of his share of the work-
ing interest to B, the transferee, subject to a right of reversion
in favor of A. The reversionary right entitles A to the reassign-
ment of a specified fraction of the working interest, after B has
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351(a), provides that no gain or loss shall be
recogniied upon a transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock
therein provided certain elements are met. See note 11 infra.
3. For an outline of the costs and planning that goes into a typical oil and
gas development arrangement, see Alexander, Financing of Oil and Gas Interests,
FIFTE ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAw 3 (LSU 1957).
4. See BREEDING & BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
§ 2.08 (1961) ; 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 424-424.44 (1959).
5. The name of this type comes from the leading case where this particular
arrangement was used. Manahan Oil Co., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947). Other varieties
are known as the Abercrombie and the Herndon types, likewise taking their names
from the leading cases of J. S. Abercrombie Co., 7 T.C. 120 (1946), aff'd, Com-
missioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co., 162 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1947) and Herndon
Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946). In the usual Abercrombie type the carried party
gives a lien or mortgage on his retained interest to secure development costs
advanced on his behalf by the grantee, but is not personally liable on the obliga-
tion for the development advances. In the usual Herndon type the owner of a
share of the working interest assigns an oil payment, payable out of the working
interest, equal in amount to the share of development costs attributable to his
working interest plus operating costs during the pay-out period of the oil pay-
ment. See generally, BREEDING AND BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF OIL PRODUO-
TIoN §§ 8.15-8.18 (1961); 2 WILLIAMS & MEmERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§424-
424.4 (1959).
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recovered the designated development and operating costs from
production. This kind of carried interest has also been drafted
so that a springing executory interest is conveyed by the carry-
ing party to the carried party, such interest becoming possessory
upon recoupment of costs.6 Since it is not unusual to find an in-
terest in oil and gas property conveyed to a person for valuable
services rendered,7 a troublesome problem arises as to whether
an interest received for services through a carried interest ar-
rangement will be taxable upon receipt.
As a general rule, section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code
includes in gross income "all income from whatever source de-
rived" unless expressly excluded, and it specifically includes as
taxable income compensation for services and gains derived
from dealings in property.8 Compensation for services, though
usually thought of in terms of money, can also take the form
of any property or economic benefit transferred for services
rendered. 9 Gains derived from dealings in property may in-
clude the fair market value of stock in a corporation or a propri-
etary interest in a partnership received in exchange for property
transferred, unless such a transfer can be classified as tax free
under the Code.' 0
When a person wishes to form a corporation, section 351 (a)
of the 1954 Code gives the statutory basis for a tax free transfer
by providing that no gain or loss is recognized if property is
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in
exchange for stock or securities of the corporation, and if im-
mediately thereafter the transferors are in control of the corpor-
ation." This provision encompasses the incorporation of a
6. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 424.1 (1959) ; see gen-
erally id. §§ 424-424.4; of. Prater v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1262, 9 Oil & Gas
Rep. 588 (1958) ; reversed, 273 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1959).
7. See, e.g., Massey v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Walls v.
Commissioner, 60 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1932) ; Thomas Blake, 20 T.C. 721 (1953).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61: "General definition. -Except as otherwise
provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source
derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation
for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items; .. . (3) Gains de-
rived from dealings in property ...."
9. Treas. Regs. § 1.61-1 (1957) ; id. § 1.61-2 (1963) ; see Commissioner v.
Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716
(1929) ; see also Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
10. See Treas. Regs. § 1.61-6 (1957) ; cf. id. § 1.351-1 (1955) ; id. § 1.721-1
(1956) ; see also cases cited in note 9 supra.
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(a) : "General Rule. No gain or loss shall
be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and immediately
after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined in section
[Vol. XXV
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new venture, an existing proprietorship or partnership, or the
creation of a subsidiary corporation. 1 2 The term "property" in-
cludes real or personal property, stock or securities of another
corporation, and money.13 However, by statutory exception,
stock or securities issued for services, such as promotional
shares issued for services rendered by an underwriter, promo-
ter, or attorney, are not issued for property.' 4 Consequently,
stock or securities issued for services are not treated as though
issued for property entitling them to tax free treatment, and
the fair market value of the securities when received is taxable
as compensation under section 61 of the Code.
The statutory basis for the tax free formation of a partner-
ship is found in section 721 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a partner
or a partnership where property is contributed to the partner-
ship in exchange for an interest therein. 5 There were no cor-
responding provisions in the 1939 Code, but under the prior law
the courts treated transfer of property in formation of a part-
nership as tax free,' 6 and the only jurisprudence involving the
receipt of a partnership for services rendered is in two deci-
sions relating to the law as it stood prior to the enactment of
section 721 in 1954. The Tax Court has held that a partnership
interest received for services rendered is taxable as ordinary
income.' 7 However, in Farris v. Commissioner 8 the Tenth Cir-
cuit, reversing the Tax Court, held that the partner who re-
ceives as partnership interest in return for services performed
for the partnership is not chargeable with ordinary income on
368(c)) (relating to 80% control requirements of the corporation]. For purposes
of this section, stock or securities issued for services shall not be considered as
issued in return for property." See also Mailloux v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 60
(5th Cir. 1963).
12. See Treas. Regs. § 1.351-1 (1955).
13. See Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935) ; George
M. Holstein, III, 23 T.C. 923 (1955).
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 351(a), quoted note 11 eupra; see Treas. Regs.
§ 1.351-1 (a).
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 721: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a
partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to
the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership."
16. See Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 594 (1934) ; see generally 6 MERTINs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.37
(1957). Indications are that § 721 represents a statement of the law as it existed
prior to 1954. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1954). See gen-
erally Nicholson, Interest in Partnership Capital Received in Exchange for Serv-
ices, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 227 (1961).
17. Leonard A. Farris, 22 T.C. 104 (1954); Harry W. Lehman, 19 T.C. 659
(1953).
18. 222 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1955).
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the receipt of the interest. The court reasoned that the partner
had made a contribution of his services to the partnership in
exchange for his right to share in the assets, profits and losses,
and that, like any other contributing partner, he should receive
his interest tax free. 9
After the passage of section 721 there were suggestions that
this section provided for the tax free treatment of the receipt of
a partnership interest in return for services on two grounds:
that the statutory reference to "any partner ' 20 may be read to
mean that upon a contribution by "any partner" in the forma-
tion of a partnership, all partners receive a tax free interest,
even though the interest received is for past services or for the
promise to render future services ;21 or that services are "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the statute.22 However, the regula-
tions under section 721 specifically point out that this section is
not applicable to a partner who in return for services receives
an interest in the capital contributions made by other partners
and that the value of the interest so received is compensation
and constitutes income under section 61 of the Code.23
19. Ibid. It is significant, however, that the Commissioner sought to assess
the tax at the partnership's dissolution and evidently did not attempt to assess
a tax at the time the service partners acquired their interests. The court found
that the service partners were chargeable with capital gains at the partnership's
dissolution.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. McDONALD, DOHAN & PHILLIPS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS
AND PARTNERSmIPS 34 (1957).
22. See Nicholson, Interest in Partnership Capital Received in Exchange for
Services, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 227, 229-30 (1961) ; cf. Roberts Co.,
5 T.C. 1 (1945) ; but see Mojonnier & Son, Inc., 12 T.C. 837 (1949).
23. Treas. Regs. 1.721-1(b) (1) (1956): "Normally, under local law, each
partner is entitled to be repaid his contributions of money or other property to
the partnership (at the value placed upon such property by the partnership at
the time of the contribution) whether made at the formation of the partnership
or subsequent thereto. To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part
of his right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a share in part-
nership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services (or in
satisfaction of an obligation) section 721 does not apply. The value of an interest
in such partnership capital so transferred as compensation for services constitutes
income to the partner under section 61. The amount of such income is the fair
market value of the interest in capital so transferred, either at the time the trans-
fer is made for past services, or at the time the services have been rendered where
the transfer is conditioned on the completion of the transferee's future services.
The time when such income is realized depends on all the facts and circumstances,
including any substantial restrictions or conditions on the compensated partner's
right to withdraw or otherwise dispose of such interest ...." (Emphasis added.)
But see FISKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS § 2.10 (1964).
On denial of rehearing (339 F.2d at 885) the court held that the "capital"
referred to in the emphasized language above was any capital of the partnership
and not necessarily the originally contributed capital. See note 32 infra.
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Where the property interests involved pertain to oil and gas,
the problem of what is the applicable law is further complicated
by the fact that GCM 2273024 indicates that anyone contributing
either materials or services for the acquisition and development
of oil and gas property, in exchange for an economic interest
therein, is to be treated as having made an investment in the
property by contributing to the pool of resources, and not as
having received a payment for the materials or services. 25 To
receive this treatment, however, certain conditions must be met.
24. GCM 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
25. See FISKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS § 2.10
(1964) ; Kirgis, Tax Aspects of the Receipt of an Economic Interest in Oil and
Gas Property in Return for Services Rendered, P-H OIL & GAS TAXES 1008
(1963) ; Assignment of an Economic Interest for Personal Services, 1 OIL & GAS
TAX Q. No. 4, 18 (1952). The portion of the ruling giving rise to this implication
reads: "If . . . the mere stipulation for oil payments to a person having an
investment or capital interest in oil properties amounts, in effect, to a retention
of a depletable economic interest in oil in place to the extent of such oil payments,
then it would seem to follow that an agreement entitled on making an investment
(thereby acquiring a capital interest) in such properties to such payments would
give him a corresponding depletable economic interest therein. The point assumes
importance in view of the many contracts entered into by owners of lessee inter-
ests with well drillers to drill wells, equipment dealers to furnish equipment, and
investors to furnish money for use in developing the leased property in return
for agreements to make stated payments out of a share of the oil. By such
arrangements, a lessee commonly lessens his own investment and the risks and
burdens attending development by agreements to share the investment obligation
and the proceeds of production. The lessee or assignee, like the lessor or assignor
who retained a share interest in production having a value equivalent to that of
the lessor's prior interest but passed on to the lessee the investment obligations
and risks that attend development for a share in production, has parted with no
capital interest but has merely in turn given another a right to share in produc-
tion in consideration of an investment made by such other person. If the driller or
equipment dealer is making an investment by which he acquires an economio
interest in oil and gas in place, expenditures made by' him represent capital exM
penditures returnable tax-free through the depletion allowance rather than by way
of expense deduction, and the oil payment rights acquired do not represent pay-
ment in property for services rendered or supplies furnished. Similarly, one who,
in return for an oil payment right, furnishes money which the lessee is pledged
to use in developing the property would be regarded as making an investment
representing an addition to the reservoir of capital investments in oil and gas in
place (as distinguished from the purchase of an oil payment right from the lessee
wherein there is no such pledge to invest the proceeds in development and the
buyer's capital investment would replace the lessee's capital investment allocable
to the interest sold). Such a transaction, involving a pledge to use the money
furnished in developing the property is distinguishable from a sale the proceeds
of which are unqualifiedly received by the seller. This view seems to accord with
the realities of the transactions. In none of such cases has the lessee parted with
a capital asset, and the investments involved are not his investments." (Emphasis
added.) GCM 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214, 221. The view that this supports
the proposition that an interest received for services or materials furnished is an
interest received in exchange for a capital contribution rests on the premise that
the contributor of services, in the proper factual situation, has relieved the actual
developer from having to make actual cash outlays for such services and has there-
fore contributed to the pool of capital to develop the property. See Assignment
of an Economic Interest for Personal Services, 1 OIL & GAS TAX Q. No. 4, 18, 20
(1952).
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The person furnishing the materials or services must receive
in return solely an economic interest in the oil and gas for which
the services are performed or the materials used, and the ma-
terials or services so contributed must add to the common pool
of investment necessary for the development of the property.26
If the materials or services are not furnished under these condi-
tions, then presumably the general rules will apply and the value
of the interest received in the property will be taxed as ordinary
income. 27 However, dictum in the recent Fifth Circuit case of
James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner25 indicates
that the general rules might apply even though the taxpayer did
bring himself within these conditions.
26. Assignment of an Economic Interest for Personal Services, 1 OIL & GAS
TAX Q. No. 4, 18, 21-24 (1952) : "It must be agreed and prearranged between
the parties that the services are contributed and that the contributor is to receive
a share right in production, marked by the assignment of an economic interest
to him, in return for his contribution. . . . The services contributed may not
effect a substitution of capital, rather they must add to the pool of capital
already invested in the oil and gas in place. . . . The contribution must perform
a function necessary to bringing the property into production or augment the
pool of capital already invested in oil and gas in place. . . The contribution
must be specific to the property in which the economic interest is acquired ...
The contribution must be definite and determinable. . . . The contributor must
look only to the economic interest acquired for his 'possibility of profit.' " See
also Kirgis, The Tam Aspects of the Receipt of an Economic Interest in Oil and
Gas Property in Return for Services Rendered, P-H OIL & GAS TAXES 1108.3
(1963).
27. Cf. Lewis Engineering, Inc., 39 T.C. 482 (1962), aff'd, James A. Lewis
Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d706 (5th Cir. 1964). See generally
FIsKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS § 8.02 (1964) ; Kirgis,
Tax Aspects of the Receipt of an Economic Interest in Oil and Gas Property in
Return for Services Rendered, P-H OIL & GAS TAXES 1008 (1963) ; Assignment
of an Economic Interest for Personal Services, 1 OIL & GAs TAX Q. No. 4, 18
(1954).
28. 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964). In Lewis the court had before it the ques-
tion whether a taxpayer rendering engineering services in a secondary recovery
operation in return for an interest in a producing property received ordinary in-
come. The court held that this was compensation for services under Internal
Revenue Code § 61, stating that it was not necessary to go behind the reasoning
of GCM 22730 since this was a production and not a development operation. In
so holding, however, the court said: "Unless a careful analysis of the reasons
underlying the issuing of GCM 22730 compelled it, the Court would have great
difficulty accepting a construction of the Code that would fly in the face of the
general provisions of the tax laws to the effect that compensation for services
must be returned as a part of gross income. See. 61(a) (1). . . . In this case, how.
ever, it is not necessary to go behind the GCM to determine whether there is an
exception for compensation in the form of an assignment of a depletable interest
in oil for the engineering services performed by the petitioner. The taxpayer, con-
cedes, as it must, that it is entitled to prevail only if it received compensation in
connection with 'the acquisition, exploration or development' of the Seay lease."
339 F.2d at 709. Since the court did not have before it the question whether GCM
22730 allows an exception to the general rules of § 61, it is submitted that under
the proper circumstances GCM 22730 will allow an exception. See notes 25-26
supra. It may be significant to note, however, that the Lewis case and the denial
of rehearing in the instant case (339 F.2d at 885) were handed down on the same
day. See notes 32, 35 infra.
In the instant case the district court thoroughly analyzed the
question whether appellee's relationship with the existing part-
nership was one of employment or of joint venture; and, upon
finding that a joint venture existed, the court summarily con-
cluded that this was a tax free exchange, under section 351 (a),
of appellee's property interest in the joint venture for the stock
interest in the newly-formed corporation.29 The court of appeals
took no issue with the district court's finding that the arrange-
ment prior to incorporation was a joint venture, but found that
this categorization did not control the question whether the
appellee's transfer to the corporation was tax free and found
that classifying the transaction as a Manahan carried interest
arrangement did not change the result.30 The court reasoned that
when appellee's interest in the partnership became vested after
the other parties had recovered their costs, he then received an
interest as compensation for his services taxable as ordinary
income. The court felt that the incorporation resulted in ordi-
nary income to appellee whether his partnership interest be-
came possessory on termination of the original contract (with
a subsequent tax-free transfer of his interest to the corpora-
tion) or whether the 13% stock interest was given in substitu-
tion for the partnership interest originally contemplated.
The instant case presents a fact situation to which applica-
tion of code section 351 (a) and 721 and the corresponding regu-
lations seem appropriate. Section 351 (a) specifically provides
that stock issued for services is not a tax free exchange,3 ' and
29. 213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963). The district court seemed to assume
that when the operation is classified as a joint venture or a partnership the
taxability of the service contribution is not at issue. However, even though such
a relation would not be one of employer-employee, there may still be a realization
of income for professional services rendered on a fee basis under § 721 of the
Code and the regulations thereunder unless an exception under GCM 22730 can
be found. See notes 23, 25, 26 supra; cf. Parr v. Scofield, 185 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.)
1950) ; Massey v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Walls v. Com-
missioner, 60 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1932).
30. The court made no mention of the effect of finding the transaction was a
carried interest arrangement other than to conclude that a carried interest may
be created as " 'compensation for services rendered, e.g., by a geologist' " and that
the "interest created by the ...contract most nearly fits into the 'Menahan' (sic)
category of 'carried interests;' that is, 'a springing executory interest conveyed
by the carrying party . . . to the carried party . . . , such interest to become
possessory upon the satisfaction of [the carrying party's] costs.' " 335 F.2d at
490. The court then found that even if appellee were considered to have had some
interest in the properties from their acquisiton, his interest would not have be-
come possessory until the carrying parties had recouped their costs, at which time
the value of the interest would have been taxable to him under Regulation
§ 1.721-1(b) (1). Ibid.31. But see Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 9-10, which
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the regulations under section 721 indicate the same result for a
partnership interest.3 2 Since appellee received a stated salary
to compensate him for his services during the payout period, he,
in reality, made no contribution to the pool of capital to acquire
the properties and thus, conceivably, was not an "investor" ta
fall within the exception of GCM 22730.33 Farris may arguably
be distinguished on its facts,3 4 but it is significant that the court
in Frazell mentioned neither Farris nor GCM 22730.35
It is submitted that, while the result in the instant case
appears correct under the facts, to accept it as a broad rule will
place the partner, who has nothing to offer but his talent and
services, in an unfortunate tax situation, and presumably he
is the party with the least amount of capital and the most need
for concessions.36 On the other hand, to limit the holding to the
facts presented will allow oil and gas property developers, at
holds that stock received from a foreign corporation in exchange for secret
processes and "know-how" will be considered as a tax-free exchange in certain
circumstances.
32. In denying rehearing (339 F.2d at 885) the court continued to interpret
Regulation § 1-721-1(b) (1), note 23 supra, as requiring appellee be held taxable,
notwithstanding the fact that the investing partners had the right to, and were
in fact repaid, the entire amount of their contributions. The court took the
position that the "capital" referred to in this regulation is whatever partnership
capital exists, whether it is the form of original contributions or capital existing
after the contributor's costs were recouped. Consequently, when the original
partners gave up their 13% interest "they necessarily gave up their own capital
interests." 339 F.2d at 886. Regulation § 1-721-1(b) (1) appears to be susceptible
of this construction since it was evidently not seriously contended that the original
partners were receiving a return of their "capital" rather than skimming off the
profits when they recouped their original investment.
33. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
35. The failure to mention GCM 22730 may lose some of its significance in
view of the fact that the James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner, 339
F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed note 28 supra, wherein the court considered
GCM 22730, and the denial of rehearing in the instant case, were handed down
on the same day, with the court continuing to rely on Regulation § 1-721-1(b) (1).
See note 32 supra.
36. There was proposed legislation to amend and revise the partnership provi-
sions in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code which passed the House of
Representatives in 1960 (H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) but did not
pass the Senate for reasons not pertaining to the partnership provisions. Under
the proposed legislation, any interest in the capital of a partnership received in
return for services rendered would be taxable as ordinary income- in effect a
codification of the regulations and the approach in the instant case-unless the
interest received were subject to a substantial restriction. Since the legislation
was defeated for reasons not pertaining to the partnership provisions it has been
suggested that the legislation will be re-introduced, although this has not yet
occurred. See Nicholson, Interest in Partnership Capital Received in Exchange
for Services, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 227, 238 (1961) ; see also Anderson
& Coffee, Proposed Revision of Partnership and Partnership Tartion: Analysis
of the Report of the Advisory Group on Subehapter K, 15 TAx L. Rsv. 285
(1959).
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least, to draft a carried interest agreement that would come
within the possible exception of GCM 22730, rather than within
the general partnership rules,87 giving a possible stimulus to
development and production of oil and gas.38 For example, the
service partner might be vested with an interest at the beginning
of the venture and assign his interest to the other parties, sub-
ject to reassignment to the service partner upon recoupment of
the others' costs. If the service partner receives no compensa-
tion in the form of a salary, but receives solely an interest in
the properties, it would appear that there is no reason to tax
this interest.3 9 If this arrangement is not available under the
instant case, the prospective developers may find that their only
resort, at best, is to minimize the tax consequences by tailoring
such devices as stock options40 or stock dividends 41 to the needs
of their particular circumstances. 42
James S. Holliday, Jr.
37. Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 761 members of an unincorporated organi-
zation engaged in the joint production, extraction, or use of property may elect not
to come within the partnership provisions of Subchapter K.
38. Because of the expense of the investment and the need of oil and gas for
the nation's security and economy, it has been suggested that the oil and gas in-
dustry be accorded some tax concessions. Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; see Galvin, The "Ought"
and "I8" of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1960).
39. For sample drafting arrangements see Galvin, Another Look at Sharing
Arrangements-Some Drafting Suggestions, Supplement to Lecture Notes, 16TH
ANNUAL INST., OIL & GAS LAW TAX. (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1965).
For a form apparently intended to apply to the facts of the instant case see id.
Appendix D.
40. Arguably, the parties in the instant case could have partially accomplished
their desired objective by means of the stock options provided by the Code which
would have given appellee an option to buy into the corporation over a period
of years at a reduced amount, provided certain elements are met. See INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, §§ 421-425, and regulations thereunder. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether such a device lends itself to speculative acquisition and development
of oil and gas properties as involved in the instant case.
41. A stockholder employee may be able to trade compensation for capital
gain benefits if he is willing to forego immediate cash. If the corporation can-
by expansion or otherwise-avoid incurring liability for the Code § 531 tax on
improper accumulation of surplus, he can "invest" his services in the corporation.
His services will presumably increase the over-all value of the business, at least
to the extent they are not offset by withdrawal of immediate monetary compensa-
tion. This increase in value can then be "capitalized" by periodic stock dividends.
The stockholder-manager would realize no taxable income when the stock is re-
ceived, and later, when he sells it, the gain would be capital gain rather than
ordinary income. However, the circumstances must be such that it does not appear
that the stock dividends are in reality given as compensation for services. See
Joy Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956) ; 1 CCH 1965 STAND.
FED. TAX GUIDE 289.
42. In the future, relief might also be obtainable through the newly modified
income averaging features of the Code. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-1305.
